“Violence Beyond the Battlefield: Civilian Targeting, Sexual Violence, and Women’s Political Empowerment,” coauthored with Burcu Savun, Caroline A. Hartzell, and Lindsay Reid, Journal of Global Security Studies, vol. 9, no. 1 (2024).
ABSTRACT
Research has established links between intrastate conflict and political gains by women following war, suggesting that changes of a positive nature can emerge from the misery of war. While much of the empirical focus on conflicts’ transformative effects has been on battle-related violence, we investigate whether pro-social effects are associated with two other types of violence perpetrated against civilians—one-sided violence and sexual violence. We expect that both one-sided violence and sexual violence spur mobilization, which in turn contributes to gains in women’s political empowerment. Informed by feminist scholarship, we also draw attention to social and political constraints associated with high levels of sexual violence, restrictions that we argue women are unlikely to confront to a similar degree with respect to high levels of one-sided and other forms of violence. We posit that these factors will result in the attenuation of gains in women’s political power in conflicts characterized by high levels of sexual violence. Using cross-national data on civil conflicts for the period 1989–2017, we find that moderate levels of sexual violence are consistently associated with gains in women’s political empowerment, an effect that diminishes in conflicts marked by widespread sexual violence. One-sided violence, on the other hand, is not associated with improvements in women’s political empowerment. Our results demonstrate the importance of considering the different forms of wartime violence, and the differential impacts these forms of violence have on women.
“Violence Against Civilians During Armed Conflict: Moving Beyond the Macro- and Micro-Level Divide,” coauthored with Laia Balcells, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 24 (2021).
ABStRACT
Early research on wartime violence against civilians highlighted a distinction between macro- and micro-level approaches. Macro-level approaches, grounded in the international relations subfield, focus on variation across countries or conflicts, while micro-level approaches, more influenced by the comparative politics subfield, focus on variation within countries or conflicts. However, some of the recent research on civilian targeting does not fit neatly into this dichotomy—such as research comparing subnational units or armed groups across conflicts or research relying on geo-referenced event data for multiple conflicts. We review the literature and advocate moving beyond the language of the micro- and macro-level divide, instead focusing on the determinants of violence against civilians at five different levels of analysis: international, domestic, subnational, organizational, and individual. While acknowledging significant advances in the field, we argue for continued research aimed at developing a more integrated theoretical understanding of the multiple actors and interactive social processes driving violence against civilians.
“Rebel Groups, Humanitarian Law, and Civil War Outcomes in the Post-Cold War Era,” International Organization, vol. 74, no. 3 (Summer 2020): 523-559.
Abstract
Do rebel group violations of international humanitarian law during civil war—in particular, attacks on noncombatant civilians—affect conflict outcomes? I argue that in the post-Cold War era, rebel groups that do not target civilians have used the framework of international humanitarian law to appeal for diplomatic support from Western governments and intergovernmental organizations. However, rebel group appeals for international diplomatic support are most likely to be effective when the rebel group can contrast its own restraint toward civilians with the government's abuses. Rebel groups that do not target civilians in the face of government abuses, therefore, are likely to be able to translate increased international diplomatic support into more favorable conflict outcomes. Using original cross-national data on rebel group violence against civilians in all civil wars from 1989 to 2010, I show that rebel groups that exercise restraint toward civilians in the face of government violence are more likely to secure favorable conflict outcomes. I also probe the causal mechanism linking rebel group behavior to conflict outcomes, showing that when a rebel group exercises restraint toward civilians and the government commits atrocities, Western governments and intergovernmental organizations are more likely to take coercive diplomatic action against the government. The evidence shows that rebel groups can translate this increased diplomatic support into favorable political outcomes.
“Terrorism, Civil War, and Insurgency,” in The Oxford Handbook of Terrorism, edited by Erica Chenoweth, Richard English, Andreas Gofas, and Stathis N. Kalyvas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).
Abstract
Much of the terrorism occurring worldwide is domestic terrorism carried out by rebel groups fighting in civil wars. However, many are reluctant to categorize domestic insurgencies as terrorist groups or to identify the tactics used by domestic insurgencies as terrorist tactics. Through a survey of the literature addressing the relationship between terrorism and civil war, I contend that research on the dynamics of violence in civil war would benefit from a more standardized definition of the concept of terrorism as well as greater consensus on how the concept of terrorism ought to be used in relation to the concept of civilian targeting. The lack of conceptual clarity in distinguishing between terrorism and civilian targeting makes it difficult to compare research findings, and thus to make progress as a field in our understanding of the causes of violence and its consequences. Despite the challenges associated with making comparisons across studies, this chapter attempts to do precisely this, drawing on research on terrorism as well as research on civilian targeting to develop insights on the causes and consequences of terrorist violence employed in the context of civil war.
“A Strategic Logic of Attacking Aid Workers: Evidence from Violence in Afghanistan,” coauthored with Neil Narang, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 61, no. 1 (2017), 38-51.
Abstract
Why do armed groups ever direct violent attacks against humanitarian organizations? While scholars have analyzed wartime violence against civilians, little research exists on violence against other noncombatants, like humanitarian organizations. Violence against aid workers, however, is common in wartime, with devastating consequences for civilians, who suffer when aid organizations respond by reducing services. This article argues that much of the violence against humanitarian organizations is strategic. By serving as substitute providers of public goods, aid organizations can bolster the government. Insurgents thus target aid workers in an effort to force them out of particular regions, undermining government support. To test this argument, we analyze variation in violence across space and time using an original panel dataset on attacks against aid workers in Afghanistan, 2008–2012. Despite aid organizations’ attempts to remain neutral, we find evidence that insurgents strategically target aid workers in areas where their services likely strengthen government support.
“Regulating Militias: Governments, Militias, and Civilian Targeting in Civil War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 59, no. 5 (2015), 899-923.
Abstract
In nearly two-thirds of civil wars since 1989, governments have received support in their counterinsurgency operations from militias. Many scholars predict higher levels of violence in conflicts involving pro-government militias because governments are either unable or unwilling to control militias. This article challenges this view, arguing that governments can and do often control militia behavior in civil war. Governments make strategic decisions about whether to use violence against civilians, encouraging both regular military forces and militia forces to target civilians or restraining regular military forces and militia forces from attacking civilians. In some cases, however, government and militia behavior differs. When a militia recruits its members from the same constituency as the insurgents, the militia is less likely to target civilians, as doing so would mean attacking their own community. Statistical analyses, using new data on pro-government militia violence in civil wars from 1989 to 2010, support these arguments.
“Terrorism in the Context of Civil War,” The Journal of Politics, vol. 75, no. 4 (2013), 1009-1022.
Abstract
Although scholars have focused primarily on transnational terrorism, much of the terrorism occurring worldwide is domestic terrorism carried out by rebel groups fighting in civil wars. This article examines variation in terrorism across civil wars, asking why some rebel groups use terrorism, while others do not. Rebel groups make strategic calculations, assessing how their government opponents and their own civilian constituencies will react to terrorism. Rebel groups challenging democratic governments are more likely to use terrorism, believing that their opponents will be sensitive to civilian losses and, therefore, likely to make concessions in response to violence. Rebel groups also consider the costs of violence, which depend on characteristics of the rebel group’s civilian constituency. Rebel groups with broad civilian constituencies select lower-casualty civilian targets to minimize public backlash. Evidence from a new data set on rebel-group terrorism in civil wars from 1989 to 2010 provides support for these arguments
Supplementary materials